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(iin 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RITA L. PATE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, 
an Arizona corporation, 
HENSEL-PHELPS COMPANY, 
a Colorado corporation, 
and ERICO PRODUCTS, INC., 
an Ohio corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLACERS, INC., 
Third Party Defendant. 
The motion of AFL-CIO and United Mine Workers of 
America, District 22, to file brief as Amici Curiae having been 
granted, the following argument is respectfully presented in 
support of Appellant's position that summary judgment was 
improperly granted and in support of Amici's position that 
statutory employers are not immune from tort liability. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Amici have asked to provide a brief to the Court 
because of the importance of what they perceive is the central 
issue presented by this case: the effect of the 1975 Amendment 
Case No. 20485 
BRIEF OF UTAH CHAPTER 
AFL-CIO AND UNITED MINE 
WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
DISTRICT 22, AMICI CURIAE 
to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 as it relates to tort immunity of 
statutory employers pursuant to the worker's compensation 
laws. This case presents a common construction project 
situation, i.e., a general contractor contracting with a 
subcontractor which in turn contracts with a second tier 
subcontractor. The plaintiff is an employee of the second tier 
subcontractor. The second tier subcontractor had the right to 
hire and fire the plaintiff, paid the plaintiff and exercised 
the day-to-day control of the plaintiff's activities. 
The trial court concluded that the general contractor, 
all the subcontractors and all of their employees were fellow 
servants. The trial court could have reached this conclusion 
only by applying the law of Utah prior to the 1975 Amendment of 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62. The Amici have had a number of their 
members involved in third party litigation arising out of 
construction and mining injuries in which the courts have 
reached varying results from the apparent confusion that has 
arisen out of the effect of the 1975 Amendment on this issue. 
Amici believe that this case presents the appropriate 
opportunity and factual situation for the Court to once and for 
all resolve this confusion by ruling that the 1975 Amendment 
affords the worker's compensation tort immunity defense only to 
the plaintiff's actual employer and to employees, officers and 
agents of such employer. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory references are particularly 
pertinent to the determination of this case: 
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35-1-42. Employers enumerated and 
defined — Regularly employed -- Independent 
contractors. The following shall constitute 
employers subject to the provisions of this 
title: 
(2) 
Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a con-
tractor over whose work he retains supervi-
sion or control, and such work is a part or 
process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons 
employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within 
the meaning of this section, employees of 
such original employer. Any person, firm or 
corporation engaged in the performance of 
work as an independent contractor shall be 
deemed an employer within the meaning of 
this section. The term "independent con-
tractor," as herein used, is defined to be 
any person, association or corporation 
engaged in the performance of any work for 
another, who, while so engaged, is indepen-
dent of the employer in all that pertains to 
the execution of the work, is not subject to 
the rule or control of the employer, is 
engaged only in the performance of a defi-
nite job or piece of work, and is subordi-
nate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1983). 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by 
wrongful acts of persons other than 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of 
said employer -- Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action --
Maintenance of action -- Notice of intention 
to proceed against third party -- Right to 
maintain action not involving employee-
employer relationship — Disbursement of 
proceeds of recovery. When an injury or 
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death for which compensation is payable 
under this title shall have been caused by 
the wrongful act or neglect of a person 
other than an employer, officer, agent, or 
employee of said employer, the injured 
empLoyee, or in case of death his depen-
dents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for 
damages against such third person. If com-
pensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance 
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of 
action against the third party and may bring 
and maintain the action either in its own 
name or in the name of the injured employee, 
or his heirs or the personal representative 
of the deceased, provided the employer or 
carrier may not settle and release the cause 
of action without the consent of the commis-
sion. Before proceeding against the third 
party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice 
of such intention to the carrier or other 
person obligated for the compensation pay-
ments, in order to give such person a rea-
sonable opportunity to enter an appearance 
in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also maintain 
an action for damages against subcontrac-
tors, general contractors, independent con-
tractors, property owners or their lessees 
or assigns, not occupying an employee-
employer relationship with the injured or 
deceased employee at the time of his injury 
or death. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1983). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Amici concur in the appellant's discussion of the 
nature of the case, disposition below and statement of facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff and defendants Marathon Steel Company and 
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Hensel-Phelps Company were not "fellow servants" as held by the 
trial court. Summary judgment on that ground was inappropriate. 
The interpretation of the lower court's action must be 
that one or both of defendants Marathon and Hensel-Phelps were 
plaintiff's statutory employer. Statutory employers are not 
entitled to tort immunity by virtue of the exclusive remedy 
provisions of the workers' compensation statutes. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a statutory employer may 
enjoy tort immunity, such immunity is contingent and 
conditional. Immunity in those circumstances could arise only 
when the statutory employer is required to and in fact does 
provide worker's compensation benefits to the injured employee, 
thus expending the quid pro quo for receipt of immunity. 
At any rate, whether or not either of these defendants 
are plaintiff's statutory employer is a disputed issue of 
material fact requiring remand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANTS HENSEL-PHELPS COMPANY 
AND MARATHON STEEL COMPANY ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO TORT IMMUNITY. 
The plaintiff, in her first point of argument, 
persuasively argues that there are genuine issues of material 
fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of whether or not 
she and defendants are fellow servants. The amici do not 
address that issue since we believe that the present law does 
not provide a fellow servant defense to anyone other than 
plaintiff's actual employer and co-employees of that employer. 
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The Court's ruling must be interpreted as finding either or 
both of these defendants to be plaintiff's statutory employer 
and vesting them with immunity on that basis. As further 
elaborated upon below, this is an incorrect interpretation of 
the present statutory scheme. 
In 1975 the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-62 to eliminate the fellow servant defense except 
regarding the plaintiff's actual employer and other employees 
of that employer. Under Utah's original compensation act, an 
injured employee was given an option whereby he could claim 
compensation from his employer or pursue a civil action. See, 
Laws of Utah 1917, Chapter 100, §72. This rule was 
subsequently altered to allow the injured worker's employer or 
insurance carrier to pursue the civil action, if the employee 
opted for worker's compensation. Utah Code. Ann. §35-1-53 
(1943). Later, that section was amended to allow the injured 
worker to pursue a civil action against "another person not in 
the same employment." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1953). This 
last prohibition against suing those "in the same employment" 
was a direct descendent of the fellow servant rule which 
prevailed at common law. Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 
493 P.2d 997 (1972). 
At first only the actual employers and actual 
co-employees were immunized from civil suits. However, a 
practice soon developed of general contractors contracting 
their work to subscontractors who had no worker's compensation 
insurance coverage for their workers as required by the 
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worker's compensation law. Thus, when the subcontractor's 
employees were injured and the subcontractor was insolvent, 
they had no remedy. In response to this problem the Utah 
legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 defining statutory 
employers. This provision protected injured workers by making 
the contractor responsible for compensation benefits in some 
instances if the subcontractor failed to provide benefits or 
coverage. 
Although the original purpose of Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-42 was to protect workers, it eventually yielded an 
unforeseen result. Subsequent judicial interpretation of this 
provision's effect upon the rights of the injured employee to 
prosecute civil damage actions under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 
(1953) altered the statute into an escape hatch through which 
tortfeasors could avoid liability to workers of other companies 
injured by their negligence. See, e.g., Adamson v. Okland 
Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973); and Smith v. 
Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994 (Utah 1972). The practical 
effect of those decisions was to insulate from liability almost 
everyone on a construction job on the theory that they were all 
in the "same employment" as that was phrase was interpreted. 
When this restrictive interpretation of the interplay 
between §§ 35-1-42 and 35-1-62 of the worker's compensation act 
became apparent, the legislature took steps to correct the 
same. The legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 by 
eliminating the prior "same employment" language and by 
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specifically providing that the definition of statutory 
employer contained in §35-1-42 did not affect the right to 
bring third party actions: 
When any injury or death for which 
compensation is payable under this title shall 
have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of a person other than an employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of said employer 
[substituted for "of another person not in the 
same employment"], the injured employee, or in 
case of death his dependents, may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or his 
heirs or personal representative may also have 
an action for damages against such third 
person . . . . 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or 
personal representative may also maintain an 
action for damages against subcontractors, 
general contractors, independent contractors, 
property owners or their lessees or assigns, 
not occupying an employee-employer relationship 
with the injured or deceased employee at the 
time of his injury or death. 
§35-1-62. (Emphasis added.) The purpose of this amendment was 
to negate the prior case law regarding tort immunity claimed by 
statutory employers in third party lawsuits. The clear intent 
of that amendment was to narrow the class of immune persons to 
actual employers and the agents and employees of the actual 
employer. 
This Court has recognized that the 1975 Amendment to 
§35-1-62 was a direct response to the decisions in Adamson v. 
Okland Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (ln73) and 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 
(1972). In Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1976), while declining to give the 1975 amendments retroactive 
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effect, this Court did state that "[t]he amendment if 
applicable would leave the plaintiff in court." 546 P.2d at 
898. In Shupe, the survivors of an employee of the general 
contractor sued the subcontractor, who defended on the basis 
that the general contractor was its statutory employer, thus 
rendering it and plaintiff's decedent in the same employment. 
Applying the prior statute (referring to "same employment") and 
case law developed under it, this Court held that the claim was 
barred. In stating that a different result would have been 
reached if the 1975 amendment had been retroactively effective, 
this Court recognized that the Utah Legislature's intent in 
amending §35-1-62 was to deliberately nullify the effect of 
§35-1-42 in cases where an injured worker asserts a tort claim 
against a tortfeasor who is not his actual employer. 
Since plaintiff's injury occurred in 1980, the statute 
as amended in 1975 is applicable. Plaintiff is barred only 
from suing her employer, Placers, Inc., and employees, officers 
or agents of Placers, Inc. This is the result that is mandated 
by the 1975 Amendment. Confusion in the trial courts, however, 
has arisen because of language found in Hinds v. Herm Hughes & 
Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978). There, a landowner 
employed a general contractor to erect some silos and 
warehouses on his land. The defendant, Hughes, was employed as 
an independent subcontractor to construct a warehouse and other 
smaller rooms for the general contractor. Hughes then 
contracted with Hayes Masonry, Hinds' employer, to construct 
the masonry walls in the warehouses. Hinds was injured while 
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performing his work as an employee of Hayes masonry. While the 
depositions that had been taken in the case were not published 
and were not part of the record, there was apparently some 
evidence that a supervisor for Hughes had some right of control 
over Hinds in performing the work he was doing when injured. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant 
Hughes on the basis that plaintiff was in the employ of Hughes 
and therefore immune. On appeal, this Court was hampered by 
the lack of a clear statement of facts and the failure to have 
published the depositions which had been taken in the case. 
This court remanded the case for trial with instructions to 
take evidence and to decide whether or not the defendant Hughes 
was the employer of the plaintiff Hinds. 
Two Justices wrote a dissenting opinion concurring in 
the reversal and remand but chiding the majority for not 
deciding the critical issue in the case: whether under the 
1975 Amendment an injured party could sue anyone other than his 
actual employer. The majority made no decision other than to 
send the case back for a determination as to whether Hughes had 
the right to "control the work done by Hinds." Amici submit 
that this is the test for determining whether Hughes was Hinds' 
actual employer. The majority obviously recognized the import 
of the 1975 Amendment when it stated M[t]his amendment enables 
an employee to sue a tortfeasor, not his employer (or the 
employer's agents, etc.) even though the injured person and the 
tortfeasor may be engaged in the same employment." Ld. at 562. 
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Unfortunately, in the course of the remand the 
majority also mentioned the term "statutory employer" giving 
birth to subsequent argument in the trial courts that the 
majority had in fact held that under the 1975 Amendment a 
statutory employer was immune from suit. It is important in 
this regard to note the distinction between an "employer" as 
that term is used in §35-1-62 and a "statutory employer" under 
§35-1-42. The test under §35-1-62 requires a determination of 
whether or not factors exist showing a traditional common law 
employee-employer relationship, i.e. the manner of hiring, the 
method of payment, the right to control the employee's work and 
the manner in which the employee's duties are carried out. 
See, e.g., Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196, 1198 
(Utah 1984). 
The definition of statutory employer under §35-1-42, 
however, directs the inquiry specifically to whether or not 
there exists three statutory criteria. They are: (1) work 
procured by one claiming to be the principal employer; (2) who 
retains the right to exercise supervision and control over the 
manner of execution of the work of the subcontractor; and (3) 
which work is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
claimed principal employer. The majority decision in Hinds did 
not mention those criteria on remand, but instead remanded for 
the sole purpose of deciding whether Hughes had the right of 
control over Hinds -- strictly a question of the existence of a 
conventional employer-employee relationship. It can be seen, 
therefore, that applying the relevant statutes as amended 
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requires the conclusion that statutory employers are not immune 
from civil suit; such immunity is now reserved only for the 
actual employer and co-employees of the plaintiff. 
Here, the evidence shows as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff's employer was Placers, Inc., since that was the 
entity that hired her, paid her, directed her, controlled her 
work and could fire her. Amici urge this Court to clarify this 
issue by ruling that under the 1975 amendment immunity from 
third party suit lies only with the actual employer of the 
plaintiff and the employees, officers and agents of that 
employer. 
II. WERE THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT A STATUTORY 
EMPLOYER MAY BE IMMUNE FROM TORT LIABILITY, 
THAT IMMUNITY AT MOST SHOULD BE CONTINGENT 
IMMUNITY. 
The purpose of worker's compensation laws is to 
protect workers. It is considered to be a quid pro quo 
arrangement; in exchange for the employer's absolute liability 
for all injuries sustained in an accident arising during or out 
of the course of employment, the employee gives up his common 
law right of action. See, e.g., Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 
supra. There is no such give and take between the injured 
party and a statutory employer where, as in the instant case, 
the actual employer provides worker's compensation benefits. 
In such a case the so-called statutory employer seeks to enjoy 
tort immunity based upon the worker's compensation exclusive 
remedy provision without incurring any liability or obligation 
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whatsoever under the worker's compensation act. Such a 
position is unreasonable and unjust. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in Thomas v. Farnsworth 
Chambers, 286 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1960) recognized this 
concept. In Thomas, the Colorado district court had held that 
since the principal contractor would be liable to a 
subcontractor's injured employee for [worker's] compensation 
if the subcontractor failed to carry insurance, then the 
employee (who had elected to receive worker's compensation 
benefits) could not maintain an action against the principal 
contractor for those injuries. The Tenth Circuit Court, in 
reversing the trial court, acknowledged the remedial purposes 
of statutory employer provisions: 
We know of course that the basic purpose of the 
so-called 'statutory employer' provisions in 
the worker's compensation acts is to vouchsafe 
the Act to all employees coming within their 
definitive provisions and to that end to 
prevent evasive action by all those engaged in 
business or enterprise, within their coverage. 
Id. at 273. The Court went on to point out, however, that 
where the principal contractor is not liable for worker's 
compensation benefits because the subcontractor has provided 
the insurance, the principal contractor is not exempt from 
common law liability. The Court stated: "[i]n other words, 
where the subcontractor has secured compensation for his 
employees, a general contractor is under no statutory 
liability, and is subject to common law liability." 286 F.2d 
at 272, citing Clark v. Monarch Engineering Company, 248 N.Y. 
107, 161 N.E. 436, 438. 
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In Fonseca v. Pacific Construction, 513 P.2d 156 
(Hawaii 1973), the Hawaii court refused to allow a general 
contractor to escape liability by hiding behind the exclusive 
remedy provision where no worker's compensation obligation had 
been assumed by or imposed upon it. As the Hawaii court 
pointed out: 
On the facts presented by this case, the 
necessary work relationship for third-party 
immunity is absent or, put another way, there 
is no quid pro quo. Under the statute as we 
have construed it, the relationship comes into 
existence only when a subcontractor fails to 
provide benefits. 
Therefore the appellees [general contractors], 
having given nothing, cannot expect complete 
immunity. 
Id. at 159. (Emphasis added.) 
The Hawaii Court reaffirmed Fonseca in Jordan v. Rita, 
670 P.2d 457 (Hawaii 1983). In that case, the subcontractor 
failed to obtain worker's compensation insurance. The general 
contractor, therefore, provided coverage for the 
subcontractor's injured employee pursuant to statute. The 
Court reasoned that since the general contractor had sustained 
the burden of providing compensation, it was entitled to the 
exclusive remedy defense: 
Under the statute as construed in Fonseca 
an immunizing relationship "comes into 
existence . . when a subcontractor fails to 
provide benefits." _Id. The general contractor 
wouLd then be compelled by HRS § 386-1 to 
assume an employer's duty to pay compensation 
to an injured employee of the subcontractor, 
and something would be given in exchange for 
the protection from suit afforded by HRS § 
386-5. 
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Id. at 459. The Hawaii Court discussed the policy reasons for 
refusing to confer immunity when the general contractor had not 
provided compensation. Citing from Fonseca, the Court stated: 
The policy considerations involved, the 
lack of "evidence that the legislature intended 
to make workmen's compensation benefits 
representative of full monetary recovery in the 
absence of essential prerequisites of coverage 
[under the law]," and "the maxim that statutes 
abrogating common law rights must be strictly 
construed" led us to conclude that "third-party 
general contractors are not immune [to 
subcontractors' employees' negligence suits] 
absent the incidents of a true employer-
employee relationship. 
Id. at 459. (Emphasis added). 
To decide otherwise would frustrate the salutory 
policy of ensuring a remedy for wrongs committed and the 
imposition of liability upon a wrongdoer. Otherwise, simply by 
taking care that all contracts with subcontractors required the 
subcontractor to cover all worker's compensation obligations, 
the statutory employer could avoid all responsibility. That 
provision of the contract is easily verifiable. Without being 
exposed to an obligation to pay worker's compensation benefits, 
or even to pay an insurance premium, the statutory employer 
could nevertheless enjoy complete immunity from the injured 
employee's claims by virtue of the exclusive remedy provision 
of Utah Code Ann. §35-l-6Q. Such a result would be manifestly 
unjust. A general contractor of a construction project, 
regarded as a "statutory employer," would have no incentive to 
avoid negligent conduct since it would have to pay neither 
insurance premiums nor worker's compensation benefits, nor 
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would it be liable in tort. So long as the contractor insisted 
that all the subcontractors carried the requisite worker's 
compensation insurance, the contractor himself could act in as 
negligent or careless a manner imaginable without fear of 
reprisal. 
If this Court were to hold that statutory employers 
may be entitled to immunity, Amici strongly urge that this 
Court declare that such immunity arises only when the actual 
employer has failed or is unable to provide worker's 
compensation benefits and the statutory employer has been 
required to and in fact has assumed the responsibility for 
providing benefits to the injured worker. A statutory employer 
who has conferred no benefit upon an injured worker should not 
be afforded immunity. 
Ill. WHETHER OR NOT EITHER DEFENDANT 
HENSEL-PHELPS OR DEFENDANT MARATHON 
ARE PLAINTIFF'S STATUTORY EMPLOYER IS 
A FACTUAL QUESTION REQUIRING REMAND. 
While amici urges this Court to clearly state that 
statutory employers are not subject to worker's compensation 
act immunity, if this Court were to hold otherwise this case 
should still be remanded. There remain in dispute material 
issues of fact regarding whether or not either of these 
defendants would be considered plaintiff's statutory employer. 
As noted above, three specific criteria must exist for 
a statutory employment relationship to arise. The claimed 
principal employer must have procured work to be done by a 
contractor; it must have retained supervision and control over 
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the manner of execution of the contractor's work; and the work 
so procured must be a part or process in the trade or business 
of the claimed principal employer. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(2) 
(Supp. 1983, relevant portion unmodified since 1975). See 
also, Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 2271, 228 
(Utah 1977); Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Utah 
1977). The statutory employer was created to provide worker's 
compensation benefit protection to those who, while not engaged 
in the traditional employer-employee relationship, are 
nevertheless subject to the principal employer's control 
regarding the manner of execution of work and are performing 
work of a character which ordinarily would be performed by the 
principal employer's own employees. See, e.g., Rustler Lodge, 
Id. and Lee, Id. 
In the instant case, the issue of statutory employment 
does not appear to have been squarely addressed in the court 
below. Thus, there are unresolved issues of material fact 
regarding whether or not either Hensel-Phelps or Marathon meet 
the criteria as plaintiff's statutory employer. Should this 
Court rule that statutory employers may be entitled to 
immunity, this case would nevertheless require remand for 
resolution of these factual questions. 
CONCLUSION 
The "fellow servant" defense has been eliminated from 
use by all but plaintiff's actual employer and actual 
co-employees. The trial court's granting summary judgment to 
defendants on that ground was therefore improper. 
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The summary judgment cannot be sustained by 
interpreting the lower court's ruling as having found one or 
both of these defendants to be plaintiff's statutory employer, 
because statutory employers are not entitled to tort immunity. 
Such a finding is inconsistent with the legislature's intent. 
Even assuming that a statutory employer may be granted 
immunity from tort liability, such immunity must be contingent 
upon the statutory employer's having been required, and 
actually having undertaken, to provide benefits to the injured 
worker. Since neither defendant herein was required to nor 
actually did provide benefits to plaintiff, immunity is 
inappropriate and the summary judgment cannot be sustained. In 
addition, there remain genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether or not either defendant may be considered plaintiff's 
statutory employer. 
Amici respectfully urges this Court to reverse and 
remand with instructions to the lower court that these 
defendants are not entitled to tort immunity. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of June, 1985. 
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